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A series of seminal theoretical papers argues that poaching may hamper company sponsored 
training. Extent, determinants and consequences of poaching remain an open empirical 
question, however. We address the empirical challenge of identifying poaching and its 
consequences using the unique institutional framework of the German apprenticeship training 
system. The Vocational Training Act provides an unambiguous and transparent definition of 
visible, measurable and transferable training across firms. We identify those establishments 
that cannot keep their best apprenticeship graduates. For these graduates in addition the 
poaching enterprise pays a wage above the wage of those who stay in the training 
establishment. We show that a small number of training establishments in Germany are 
poaching victims. These establishments train more apprentices than firms which can attract 
their apprenticeship graduates. 
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1 Introduction 
A number of theoretical contributions of company sponsored general training stress the 
possibility that freshly trained workers are poached from the training firm after training has 
taken place. Thus, the training firm might lose (part of) its training investments and the 
poaching or outsider firm can satisfy its skill demand without own training investments. 
Poaching therefore can lead to an under-investment in training because firms may be hesitant 
to pay for the acquisition of skills for workers who leave before the training investments are 
paid-off. Under-investment in training undermines the competitiveness and innovation of 
companies. (Stevens 1994, 2001; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999b; Booth and Zoega, 2004; 
Leuven, 2005). Existence, extent and determinants of poaching, however, remain an 
empirical question which is not analysed so far (Pischke 2007, Brunello and DePaola 2009). 
Measuring poaching is an empirical challenge. It requires an institutional framework for firm 
sponsored training in general - visible and transferable – human capital and a unique 
definition of training across firms (Pischke, 2007). Such an institutional framework 
represents the German apprenticeship system (Soskice, 1994; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; 
Dustmann and Schönberg, 2009; Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2009).  
This paper shows the existence of poaching, estimates a lower bound of the extent of 
poaching and analyse the consequences of poaching on firms’ training intensity. The paper 
identifies poaching when the training firm wants to retain an apprenticeship graduate but 
cannot attract the best or most productive one. The best apprenticeship graduate leaves the 
training firm and works in the poaching firm which pays a higher wage than he or she would 
get in the training firm. The paper estimates that at least 3.8 percent of the training firms are 
poaching victims. 
Furthermore, the paper discusses the consequences of poaching on the training intensity. 
While the most theoretical contributions conclude that poaching leads to underinvestment of 
training, the paper shows that poaching increases the training intensity by three percentage 
points. However, the conditions for identifying poaching restrict the sample and inferences to 
large training firms which can attract a minimum proportion of their own apprenticeship 
graduates. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: The next section reviews the poaching 
and training literature. Then, we describe the empirical design and the data. Afterwards, we 
present our additional assumptions to identify poaching and describe firms that are poaching 
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victims. Then, we discuss the consequences of poaching on firms training intensity. The last 
section concludes. 
 
2 Background Discussions 
A long tradition of theoretical models of on-the-job training analyses incentives for firms’ to 
invest in general skills of their workers induced through several market imperfections. 
According to these models, labour market imperfections create a wedge between worker’s 
wage and productivity. Moreover, the marginal effect of training on productivity in the 
training firm exceeds the marginal effect of training on outside wages. Thus, the training firm 
benefits from training. Moreover, the firm only has an incentive to pay for general skills if 
these profits increase in skills and the trained workers stay with a positive probability in the 
training firm. However, the market imperfection simultaneously induces poaching when the 
poaching firm can earn a rent on the trained skills and the trained workers have a positive 
probability of leaving the training firm (Steven, 1994, Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a, 1999b; 
Booth and Zoega, 2004; Leuven, 2005). The transferability of the acquired skills between 
firms and the visibility and transparency of the acquired skills for outsider firms determines 
the probability of an outside offer and, hence, poaching (Lazear, 1986; Stevens, 1996, 2001). 
Moreover, poaching can take place when the future employment is ex-ante non-contractible 
so that a hold-up problem arises. 
Even if poaching and company sponsored training should simultaneously exists, the 
theoretical consequences of poaching on firms training intensity are not clear. The most 
contributions conclude that poaching might hamper training investments in general skills 
because the training firm loses a part of its returns to investment. In detail, Stevens (1996) 
argues that poaching, first, can lead to a lower number of trainees because a part of the returns 
to investment accrues to the future employer and the training firm only trains until the 
marginal costs of training equals the marginal benefits. Second, the training firm may choose 
a lower training quality. Even if the Vocational Training Act defines the type of skills, the 
training firm may choose the quality of training. The training firm choose a too low quality of 
training, if the marginal benefit of increasing the skill level is less than the marginal social 
benefits.  
Poaching can also increase the training intensity, if training firms screen apprentices during 
the training period1
                                                 
1 Author (2001) has shown that temporary help firms use training as a screening period. 
 or have to make sure that their demand for skilled employees can be 
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satisfied by their own former apprentices. An additional condition is that the least productive 
skilled employee who stays with the training firm has a productivity level that covers the 
investment costs at least in the long run. 
Even if a huge body of theoretical literature analyses company-sponsored training and 
poaching, empirical papers have only shown that employers mostly pay for the costs of initial 
training and skill upgrading independently of whether the accumulated skills can be 
transferred to other employers (Barron et al., 1999; Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1999; Booth 
and Bryan, 2004; Bassanini et al., 2007). There is some indirect evidence of poaching, 
however. Both and Bryan (2004) use data from the British Household Panel and show that the 
wage increase at the future employer exceeds the wage increase at the training firm for 
workers who report company-sponsored training in general skills during the last year. In a 
similar way, Lowenstein and Spletzer (1999) show that employers mostly reward skills 
trained during a previous employment. They analyse US datasets NLSY and EOPP. Indeed, 
both studies analyses individual data which lack information about the number of trained 
employees in each training firm. The training firms may screen employees during the training 
and may retain only the best trainees. Moreover, both studies analyse further training which 
incorporates different types and length of training. Therefore, both studies show that firm 
sponsored training is mostly general but we can not infer that the new firm poached the 
switched employees.  
 
3 Empirical Design 
An appropriate study of poaching and its impact on company sponsored training requires an 
institutional framework which allows researchers to investigate whether firms pay for training 
in general – transferable and visible – skills and prevent ex-ante contracts of employment 
after training has taken place. The German apprenticeship training system provides such a 
unique institutional framework which fulfils all preconditions for empirically analysing 
poaching and firm sponsored training.2
The apprenticeship training in Germany follows a curriculum laid down in the Vocational 
Training Act. The Vocational Training Act describes necessary equipment and requirements 
  
                                                 
2 For the sake of clean identification of poaching, we concentrate on job entrants after apprenticeship training. 
We therefore exclude a vast area of poaching activities concentrating on experts whose transfer can serve as a 
mechanism for the acquisition of externally developed knowledge (Song et al., 2003). We assume that learning 
by hiring (means to enter new product markets, acquisition of internally non-existing knowledge or social 
capital) is only a minor point in poaching skilled employees at the beginning of their careers. 
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which have to be fulfilled to train apprentices adequately and the (minimum) skills which 
have to be trained in each training occupation. Moreover, apprentices receive a graded skill 
certificate at the end of the training period. The observance of these guidelines and the final 
exam is centrally monitored by the chambers of industry and craft (Franz and Soskice, 1995; 
Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998).  
This institutional framework offers, first, a consistent and unambiguous definition of training 
across firms. Apprenticeship graduates who receive training in different firms but in the same 
occupation have comparable and guaranteed minimum skills. Second, training regulations 
further imply that training is observable by outsider firms documented by graded final exams 
from the chambers for the practical part and the vocational schools for the theoretical part. An 
outsider firm therefore knows the skill level of an apprenticeship graduate in a given 
occupation. Third, the skills are not only observable but also transferable. Institutional 
arrangements severely limit firms’ ability to structure apprenticeship training so that it 
involves mostly firm-specific training.3
                                                 
3 This fact can also be derived from low or non-existent wage disadvantages establishment changers face with 
respect to stayers directly after their apprenticeship training (Goeggel and Zwick, 2011). 
 Fourth, future employment of apprenticeship 
graduates is non-contractible. Apprenticeship training contracts legally terminate at the day 
after the final exam and employment has to be negotiated at the end of the apprenticeship. 
Fifth, apprenticeships are a training investment at least for some occupations. In detail, 
training firms in blue-collar occupations in manufacturing invest in the training of their 
apprentices whereas training firms in white-collar occupations can usually recoup the training 
costs until the end of the apprenticeship due to the productive work of the apprentices 
(Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2009; Schönfeld et al., 2010). Differences in training investments 
between occupations allow us to test whether poaching is more important in occupations that 
demand investments during the apprenticeship period. Sixth, apprenticeship graduates starting 
their first job are a relatively homogeneous group in terms of age and education. Therefore, 
the initial conditions problem does not appear. The initial conditions problem arises when we 
by compare job changers and stayers with an unknown job history and differences in tenure 
(Flinn, 1986). Initial conditions are the same for all apprentices and apprenticeship graduates, 
however. All apprentices do not have prior experience on the labour market but directly come 
from school. They all started their training at the same point in time (and therefore there are 
no differences in occupation selectivity during the business cycle) and their contract ends at 
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the same point in time (therefore there are no differences in specific labour demand at the 
moment they start their career). 4
Additionally to such institutional framework, an analysis of poaching requires information 
about the training and the potential poaching firm of the trainee and the timing and duration of 
training. Such data structure provides the longitudinal version 2 of the linked employer-
employee data set of the IAB (LIAB). The LIAB combines social security records individual-
based employment statistics with plant-level data from the IAB Establishment Panel. The 
distinctive feature of the LIAB is the combination of administrative information on 
individuals and details concerning establishments that employ those. The longitudinal version 
of the LIAB comprises all establishments with three consecutive observations in the IAB 
Establishment Panel between 1999 and 2002 and all employees who worked at least one day 
in those establishments between 1997 and 2003. For these employees, the data report the 
complete employment history between 1993 and 2006 (Jacobebbinghaus 2008)
 
Taken together, apprentices receive a broadly accepted, visible and transparent training 
certificate at the end of their training period that makes them flexible in accepting a skilled 
job in either their training firm or an outsider firm. Therefore, firms have to actively offer a 
contract for the apprenticeship graduates either to stay in the training firm or to attract from 




The individual-based social security records contain the exact wage, employment duration 
and information about the occupation, education, qualification, gender, nationality and an 
employer identifier. We use the 2-digit occupation code for identifying the training 
occupation. The LIAB longitudinal data are particularly well suited for our analysis because 
the employment history is available as spell-data. The spell-data allow a day-based calculation 
of every recruitment, lay-off, status change (apprentices to skilled worker), occupation 
change, and the exact calculation of employment and unemployment duration of every 
individual. We therefore can calculate the exact number of apprenticeship graduates in each 
. We calculate 
all labour-related variables from the individual social security records and all establishment-
related variables from the IAB Establishment Panel. 
                                                 
4 Moreover, Festerer et al. (2008) find no significant selection in different apprenticeships. 
5 The LIAB longitudinal version contains around 4500 establishments. 
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firm/ occupation cluster and have information about the wage of the apprenticeship graduates 
who stayed and left the training firm.  
We restrict the data to spells after 1998 because we cannot distinguish apprentices from 
participants in internships before 1999 (Jacobebbinghaus et al. 2009) and drop agriculture and 
non-profit firms. We use only those apprenticeship graduates with full-time employment in 
the first job after the apprenticeship and drop individuals who earn less than 50 percent or 
more than 100 percent of the average in the occupation. We do not include 2 year 
apprenticeships that mostly contain low-level apprenticeships. Moreover, we only use 
establishments with at least two graduated apprentices in the same occupation in a certain 
year between 1999 and 2003. We need this restriction to identify poached apprenticeship 
graduates, as described in the next section. 
Furthermore, we construct variables of the establishment worker composition on the basis of 
the individual social security records such as qualification, gender and nationality shares. The 
establishment-level information comprises the age of the establishment, legal structure, 
industrial relations and investments. 
 
5 Identification of Poaching 
Even if apprenticeship graduates are prone to be poached, poaching requires an employer 
change against the will of the training firm. Therefore, we identify poaching when the training 
firm wants to retain an apprenticeship graduate but cannot attract the best or most productive 
apprenticeship graduate. Our poaching definition therefore contains two conditions: The best 
apprenticeship graduate leaves the training firm and receives a higher wage in the poaching 
firm than he or she would get in the training firm. The first condition states that the switching 
apprenticeship graduate is more productive than the staying apprenticeship graduate, within a 
firm, occupation and year cell. This condition entails the possibility that employers plan from 
the start to keep only a certain fraction of apprenticeship graduates because they screen 
apprentices during the apprenticeship. It however postulates that employers want to keep the 
best apprenticeship graduates. The identification of this condition requires that we only 
include training firms that have staying and leaving apprenticeship graduates in the same 
occupation. The second poaching condition states that the switching apprenticeship graduate 
receives a higher wage in the poaching firm than he or she would get in the training firm. This 
implies that the training firm was not able to pay the leaving apprenticeship graduate a higher 
wage than the poaching firm. This condition also postulates the possibility that training firms 
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is willing to bid the wage of the leaving apprenticeship graduate up to her or his productivity 
but assess the productivity of the leaving apprenticeship graduate lower than the poaching 
firm. 
For identifying poaching, we compare staying with immediately switching apprenticeship 
graduates who learnt in the same firm and both work in the same training occupation as 
skilled employees. The immediately switchers find his or her new job within 10 days after 
graduation, so that we can assume that the employer change marks poaching. Many authors 
interpret short non-employment spells of switchers as a sign for quitting instead of firing. 
These immediate employer movers make up 10 percent of all apprenticeship graduates in our 
sample. Moreover, the stayers account for around two thirds of all apprenticeship graduates in 
our final sample (compare Appendix A for a discussion of the mobility pattern of 
apprenticeship graduates).  
We operationalize the first condition, “the best apprentice leaves” by comparing the wages of 
the staying and switching apprentices in the same establishment/occupation/year cluster at the 
end of the apprenticeship. Before we discuss the wage structure of apprentices, we briefly 
summarise the institutional wage setting for apprentices. Apprentices’ wages are usually set 
by collective bargaining on the sectoral level according to § 17 of the Vocational Training Act 
(BBiG) – this means that apprentices in one of the 26 economic sectors defined by collective 
bargaining should earn the same wage irrespective of their occupation. According to § 17 
BBiG a firm has to pay an appropriate wage also when it is not covered by collective 
bargaining. A wage is appropriate, if it is at most 20 percent below the collective bargaining 
rate. The chambers control whether the wages in the training contracts are within that range. 
There is some leeway for individual wage setting even for employers with collective 
bargaining, however: First, enterprises are free to voluntarily pay a wage mark-up. Second, 
there are usually regional differences in the more than 500 wage contracts concerning 
apprentices (mainly between East and West Germany, but also for smaller regions). Third, 
collective bargaining agreements might include different earnings level options for 
apprentices and firms might attribute their apprentices differently to these levels. Fourth wage 
supplements for especially demanding or dangerous jobs or extra hours are possible. 
In contrast to the institutional regulations, the wage variation is striking between apprentices 
in the same apprenticeship year at the same point in time even in the same occupation and in 
one establishment. The standard deviation of apprentices’ wage at the end of the 
apprenticeship is zero for only 4.4 percent of firms with at least one moving and one staying 
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apprenticeship graduate. Most training establishments pay their apprentices slightly different 
wages even if we only compare apprentices of the same age and education background within 
the same establishment and occupation cell (compare Appendix B for a more detailed 
discussion about apprentices´ wage structure). The average dispersion of the wages is 2.85 
Euros a day that account for around 10 percent of the daily gross wages within a firm and 
occupation cluster. The average apprentice salary within an establishment/occupation cluster 
is 28.07 Euros a day and the range between the smallest and highest salary is 8.91 Euros a 
day. 
We take advantage of the wage dispersion and interpret the wage differences between 
apprentices at the end of the apprenticeship within the same firm and in the same occupation 
as relative differences in productivity. We can interpret the wage differences as relative 
productivity differences because the apprentices learn the same job and the Vocational 
Training Act determines the tasks that apprentices should perform and learn at the end of the 
apprenticeship. Therefore, the wage between two apprentices in the same occupation does not 
differ because both perform different tasks. Moreover, apprentices in the same training 
occupation at the end of the apprenticeship are identical in terms of observable variables such 
as age, education, the point in time they start with their apprenticeship and their prior working 
experience6
                                                 
6 Table A4 displays a regression of individual characteristics on the wage of apprentices.  
. We only analyse the relative wage difference between apprentices within an 
occupation, year and establishment cell. On the one hand, firms may differ in the opportunity 
to pay a wage mark-up to the collective agreement. On the one hand, training occupations 
may differ in the training curricula and skills. Therefore firms might be willing to voluntary 
pay wage mark-ups for certain occupations. Furthermore, yearly wages might differ too. 
The establishment/occupation/year wage difference between apprentices permits the 
identification whether the training firm values the productivity of switching apprenticeship 
graduate higher than his or her staying counterpart. However, this statement requires a 
plausibility check about the predictive power of the apprentices’ wage rank and the respective 
rank in the first full-time employment rank in an establishment/occupation/year cell. First, 
Spearman’s Rank Correlation test of the stayers wage rank stability rejects the independency 
between both ranks (see appendix table A2). Second, apprentices who receive an apprentice 
wage in the bottom (upper) quartile usually receive a skilled worker wage in the bottom 
(upper) half of the wage distribution (see appendix table A3). Third, the last apprenticeship 
wage is a major determinant of the first skilled job wage (see appendix table A4). 
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However, these small wage differences are not observable by outsider firms but only by the 
external researcher. For outsider firms, apprenticeship graduates in one firm and occupation 
cluster are homogenous in terms of schooling, age and general, occupational-specific and 
firm-specific skills. The outsider firm knows nothing about the relative wage rank of 
apprentices within a firm and occupation. 
On the basis of our first poaching condition, we find that 23.9 percent of these immediate 
moving apprenticeship graduates earn more than the best paid stayer at the end of the 
apprenticeship within an occupation and establishment cell. Table 2 further displays the 
occupational groups blue-collar manufacturing and white collar. These occupation groups 
significantly differ in the amount of firms training investment. Apprentices in blue-collar 
manufacturing occupations are unambiguously considered as demanding substantial training 
investments of firms. The investment cost for blue-collar apprentices are on average three 
times higher than that for white-collar apprentices (Schönfeld et al., 2010). White-collar 
apprentices, by contrast, are more productive during the apprenticeship and recoup (most of) 
their training costs already during the apprenticeship training period (Mohrenweiser and 
Zwick, 2009). Comparing white-collar and blue-collar manufacturing apprentices permits the 
analysis of different levels of investment on the poaching externality. Table 2 shows that 28.9 
percent of all immediate movers in blue-collar manufacturing occupations, which can be 
classified as investment occupations, earn more than the stayers in the training firm at the end 
of the apprenticeship. This share is higher than for white-collar occupations which are more 
beneficial for the training firms during training. 
The first condition, however, is not sufficient to identify poaching. The decision to leave the 
training firm might be based on regional preferences and not a superior wage offer. Therefore, 
we impose the second condition that the poaching firm offers a wage mark-up for the 
switching apprenticeship graduates. For evaluating the wage mark-up, we need a 
counterfactual wage for the switching apprenticeship graduate which discloses the wage that 
the leaving apprenticeship graduate would receive if he or she stays in the training firm. We 
construct this counterfactual wage on the basis of the wage of apprenticeship graduates who 
stay in the training firm. In detail, we use the highest wage of all apprenticeship graduates 
who stay in the respective occupation as the counterfactual wage. This wage is the highest 
revealed willingness to pay for a skilled job entrant with the same qualification in the training 
firm. Comparing the counterfactual wage with the wage of the switching apprenticeship 
graduate in the new firm, table 3 demonstrates that 25.5 percent of all immediate movers in 
the training occupation earn a higher wage than the best paid apprenticeship graduate in the 
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training firm. Again, this proportion is higher for immediately moving apprenticeship 
graduates in expensive blue-collar manufacturing occupations than in white-collar 
occupations. 
Note that the second condition alone is also not sufficient to identify poaching. For example, 
the second best paid apprentices could receive a wage mark-up but the training firm only 
plans to hire the best apprentice. Therefore, we combine both conditions to identify poaching. 
We define an employer change of an apprenticeship graduate as poaching when he or she 
receives a higher wage at the end of the apprenticeship and earns more in the first job after the 
apprenticeship than the best staying apprenticeship graduates. Table 4 displays the existence 
of poaching according to our strict criteria. 7.5 percent of all immediately moving 
apprenticeship graduates fulfil both poaching conditions. Moreover, we observe a leaving 
“best” apprenticeship graduate more frequently in blue-collar manufacturing occupations than 
in white-collar occupations. 
 
6 Characteristics of Poached Firms 
Turning to the establishment level, around 3.8 percent of the training firms with at least two 
apprenticeship graduates in the same training occupation employ at least one poached 
apprenticeship graduates. The majority of these firms only lose one apprenticeship graduate 
this way. This number shows that poaching indeed seems not to be widespread in the 
apprenticeship system in Germany but it exists. 
However, this number displays only a lower bound of poaching because we conditioned on 
firms with at least one staying and one leaving apprenticeship graduates within a firm, 
occupation and year cluster. This restriction excludes two types of firms which might be 
likely poaching victims. First, the poaching conditions exclude firms that only train one 
apprenticeship graduate in a training occupation. This group contains many small firms which 
generally retain a smaller proportion of apprenticeship graduates and are less attractive for 
apprenticeship graduates than large firms. Second, the poaching condition excludes firms that 
cannot attract a single apprenticeship graduates. Such firms may particularly be poaching 
victims. Both identification conditions lead to a sample of large firms. However, large firms 
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incur higher training investment costs and are more attractive for employees than small firms 
(Soskice, 1994). 7
                                                 
7 Mohrenweiser and Backes-Gellner (2010) compare firm characteristics of training firms which retain less than 
20 percent and more than 80 percent in three consecutive years. The former are smaller, invest and export less 
and are less likely covered by a works council or a collective bargaining contract. 
  
Table 5 describes the poaching victims and firms which attract all apprenticeship graduates 
they liked, given our sample restrictions. The latter tend to train a smaller fraction of 
apprentices and employ fewer employees than the poaching victims. Poaching victims pay a 
lower entrance wage and usually hire workers with more experience. Otherwise, the share of 
part-time, skilled workers and older workers is similar between both groups.  
 
7 The Consequences of Poaching on Firms Training Intensity 
The poaching conditions restrict the analysis on the consequences of poaching on firms’ 
intensity of training. We cannot draw inferences about the training incidence, whether training 
firms retrieve from training because of poaching.  
Table 6 displays the results of the OLS regression of dummy variable whether a firm is 
poaching victim on the proportion of apprentices for establishments which train at least two 
apprenticeship graduates. The explanatory variable “Firm is Poaching Victim” equals one if 
our strict two-part poaching definition applies. The table shows estimations with two different 
control groups. Column one includes all firms with at least two apprenticeship graduates 
within an establishment/year/occupation cluster. Column two includes only firms that can 
attract at least 50 percent of all apprenticeship graduates.  
Both estimates show that training firms which are poaching victims tend to train a higher 
number of apprentices than training firms which can prevent poaching. The training intensity 
increases by 2.9 percentage points if the firm is a poaching victim. This accounts for one third 
of the proportion of apprentices relative to the average training intensity of 8.5 percent for 
non-poaching victims. 
The control variables have the expected signs and are usually well-known from previous 
studies investigating the determinants of apprentices training intensity (Harhoff and Kane, 
1997; Beckmann, 2002). The training intensity concavely increases in the number of 
employees. Works councils are associated with a lower share of apprentices and the number 
of employees has a negative concave influence on the share of apprentices. 
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We run a series of robustness checks about the estimates of the training intensity and the 
identification conditions of poaching. First, the consequences of poaching on the training 
intensity of firms may be endogenous when unobservable firm characteristics determine the 
training intensity and whether a firm is poaching victim. For example, a firm may train more 
apprentices because the firm pursues a low cost strategy and uses apprentices as cheap 
substitutes for unskilled workers.8 Hence, this firm is simultaneously not interested in 
retaining the best but the cheapest apprenticeship graduate. Moreover, a simultaneity problem 
may arise when firms increase the training intensity when they anticipate that poaching is 
likely. We test the robustness of our results using an instrumental variables approach to tackle 
the endogeneity issue. We use the within-firm changes in the labour demand of young 
workers as an instrument. More specifically, we instrument the poaching victim using 
changes in the retention rate of an establishment´s apprenticeship graduates during the 
observation period. The retention rate is defined as the share of staying apprenticeship 
graduates on all apprenticeship graduates in a firm.9
                                                 
8 Smits (2006) and Mohrenweiser and Zwick (2009) discuss different training motivations and their 
consequences. 
9 Mohrenweiser and Backes-Gellner (2010) show the stability of firms’ retention rate over time. 
 However, a shock in the firm’s labour 
demand leads to a lower retention rate of apprenticeship graduates than in another year 
because this is an efficient and cheap way to reduce the number of employees. Our results 
remain robust when we run the IV estimation (see appendix table A5). 
Second, we relax our rather strong poaching conditions. We redefine the first condition that 
the leaving apprenticeship graduate has to earn more than the mean of the staying 
apprenticeship graduates within a firm/occupation/ year cluster at the end of the 
apprenticeship. This weaker condition states that training firm suffer poaching when they lose 
one of the best 50 percent of the graduates and assumes that training firms plan to hire the 
most apprenticeship graduates. Around twice as much apprenticeship graduates fulfil this 
poaching condition. This recalculation leads to 738 poaches apprenticeship graduates in 4.1 
percent of firms classified as poaching victims. The results of the estimations about the 
consequences of poaching remain robust. Moreover, the definition of poaching remains an 
open question. Form the firms’ point of view, the first poaching condition (the leaving best 
apprenticeship graduate) alone may be seen as poaching or, concerning the weaker 
assumption if one of the best 50 percent leaves the training firm. However, we have to be sure 
that the training firm wants to retain an apprenticeship graduate and aim to estimate a lower 
bound so that we impose both rather strict poaching conditions. 
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Third, we test different definitions of training occupations for example the more precise 3-
digit occupation code. Even if the 3-digit occupation code might be more precise than the 2-
digit code, two occupations that have the same in the 2-digit but different in the 3-digit code 
are mostly only different specialisation of metal mechanics for example. Different 
specialisation might be seen as substitutes for potential outsider firms so that a 3-digit code is 
in our view less appropriate for our kind of analysis. However, using a 3-digit code does not 
change our main results about the existences of poaching and the consequences on training 
intensity. 
Fourth, the wage definition in the LIAB data entails full-time wages for apprentices. 
Additional extra hours and bonuses might be paid only for a fraction of apprentices in one 
establishment/occupation/ year cell. However, if extra hours or bonuses are more likely paid 
for the more productive apprentices and firms are interested in keeping the best apprenticeship 
graduates; this imprecise wage measure does not invalidate our measure of poaching. 
 
8 Conclusions 
This paper presents an empirical analysis on the existence of poaching, estimates a lower 
bound of poaching and analyse the consequences of poaching on firm’s training intensity. The 
study is based on a unique identification of poaching and exploits the institutional framework 
of apprenticeship training in Germany. Apprenticeship graduates are a good basis for a 
poaching analysis because training is regulated in the Vocational Training Act and therefore 
the acquired skills are visible by outsiders and transferable between firms. We identify 
poaching using two conditions. First, we show that a small number of training firms cannot 
retain their best apprenticeship graduates. Therefore, we take advantage of the relative wage 
differences between switching and staying apprenticeship graduates at the end of the 
apprenticeship training within the same establishment, year, and occupation. Second, 
poaching firms pay the switching apprenticeship graduate a wage above the highest wage of 
the staying apprenticeship graduates in the training firm. Apprentices in blue-collar 
occupations in manufacturing are more likely to be poached than apprentices in white-collar 
firms. Combining both poaching conditions leads to a lower bound of 3.8 percent of training 
firms which are poaching victims. However, we can only estimate a lower bound because our 
poaching conditions restrict our sample to larger firms that are generally seen to be less prone 
to poaching than small firms.  
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This paper confirms two theoretical findings. First, it presents the first clean empirical 
evidence of the coexistence of poaching and firm sponsored training. Second, it shows that 
poaching does not hamper firms training investments for large firms. 
The paper presents feasible and innovative conditions for identifying poaching. However, it is 
only the first step for analysing consequences of poaching for company-sponsored training. 
The paper lacks a dynamic perspective and cannot answer if poaching forces firms to 
withdraw from training. The poaching conditions only permit the identification of a lower 
bound restricts the analysis to large firms and does not allow estimations of consequence for 
the training incidence. Moreover, it remains for future research to investigate the early career 
perspectives of poached and staying apprenticeship graduates in terms of wage growth and 
retention in the first employment firm, particularly the investigation of the winners curse. 
Moreover, the direction of the employee switchers is not clear. Good apprenticeship graduates 
may simply switch to a more attractive employer who can pay a wage mark-up because of a 
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Table 1: Wage dispersion of apprenticeship graduates at the end of the apprenticeship within 
establishment/occupation/year cells. 




Daily wages in Euros, Sample restrictions: at least two (one moving and one staying) apprenticeship graduates in 
each establishment/occupation/year cell. N= 70302. The mover finds his or her new job in the training 




Table 2: Proportion of best apprenticeship graduates that leave the training firm  
Occupation Proportion 
Blue-collar manufacturing 0.289 
White-Collar 0.187 
Total 0.239 
Apprenticeship graduates who earn more than all staying apprenticeship graduates within an occupation/ 
establishment cell at the end of the apprenticeship as a proportion of all immediate movers. Sample restrictions: 
at least two (one moving and one staying) apprenticeship graduates in each occupation/ establishment cell. 
N=5910. The mover finds his or her new job in the training occupation within 10 days after apprenticeship 
termination. Source: own calculations of the LIAB longitudinal version 2 1999-2003. 
 
 19 
Table 3: Proportion of immediately switching apprenticeship graduates receiving a wage 
mark-up. 
Occupation Proportion 
Blue-collar manufacturing 0.371 
White-Collar 0.189 
Total 0.255 
Apprenticeship graduates who earn more than all staying apprenticeship graduates within an 
occupation/establishment cell at the first full-time employment as a proportion of all immediate movers. Sample 
restrictions: at least two (one moving and one staying) apprenticeship graduates in each occupation/ 
establishment cell. N=5910. The mover finds his or her new job in the training occupation within 10 days after 
apprenticeship termination. Source: own calculations of the LIAB longitudinal version 2 
 
 
Table 4: Occupations of poached apprenticeship graduates. 
Occupation Proportion 
Blue-collar manufacturing occupations 0.110 
White collar occupations 0.057 
Total 0.075 
Proportion of poached apprenticeship graduates who receive a higher wage at the end of the apprenticeship and a 
higher wage at their first employment as a skilled worker than the staying apprenticeship graduates in the 
training firm. Sample restrictions: at least two (one moving and one staying) apprenticeship graduates in each 
occupation/ establishment cell. N=5910. The mover finds his or her new job in the training occupation within 10 
days after apprenticeship termination. Source: own calculations of the LIAB longitudinal version 2 
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Number of Employees 1505 555 0.000 
Share of Apprentices 0.107 0.085 0.005 
Share of Skilled Workers 0.653 0.658 0.895 
Share of Part-Time Workers 0.076 0.073 0.092 
Share of Employees who are older than 55 0.093 0.099 0.744 
Collective Bargaining Agreement 0.9858 0.821 0.445 
Works Council 0.9074 0.798 0.389 
Log(Investments per Capita) 14.51 13.45 0.000 
Export Share 0.234 0.186 0.000 
Daily Entrance Wage 36.09 37.17 0.000 
Tenure in days 3890 3476 0.000 
Difference Experience and Tenure (days) 2364 2066 0.000 
Source: own calculations on basis of the longitudinal version 2of the LIAB. 
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Table 6: OLS Regressions of the Proportion of Apprentices on all Employees10
 
.  
(1)  (2) 








Squared Number of Employees  













Controls Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations 4561  3281 
Pseudo R sq 0.40  0.39 
Dependent variables: Proportion of Apprentices on all Employees. Standard errors clustered on establishment, z-
values in parenthesis, column (1) control group contains all establishments with at least two apprenticeship 
graduates and column (2) control group contains establishments that attract at least 50% of the apprenticeship 
graduates;  further control variables: Proportion of skilled workers, part-time workers and workers which are 
older than 55 years, female worker and foreign workers on all employees, proportion of leaving and newly hired 
workers with an apprenticeship degree and work experience on all employees, 12 industry and 4 yeas dummies. 
Source: LIAB longitudinal version 2 1999-2003. 
                                                 
10 All employee shares do not include apprentices in the denominator. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Descriptive Comparison between Stayer and Mover 




Daily wage at 
the end of the 
apprenticeship 
in Euro 
Daily wage at 
the first fill-
time employ-
ment in Euro 
Stayer 65.89 28.37 70.81 
Mover within 10 day, same occupation 10.27 28.72 67.74 
Mover within 10 day, occupational switcher 5.73 25.69 56.00 
Mover with unemployment spell of more 
than 10 days, same occupation 
5.40 26.85 70.63 
Mover with unemployment spell of more 
than 10 days, occupational switcher 
8.34 25.13 51.25 
Out of labour force 4.37 26.93 -- 
Number of observations: 46878, all stayers in establishments with at least two apprenticeship graduates. Source: 
LIAB longitudinal version 2, 1999-2003. 
 
Table A2: The stability of the stayer wages before and after the end of the apprenticeship 
period 














Comparison between the wage rank at the end of the apprenticeship and the first full-time employment after the 
apprenticeship of stayers in the same occupation. Number of observations: 46878, all stayers in establishments 
with at least two apprenticeship graduates. Source: LIAB longitudinal version 2, 1999-2003. 
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Table A3: The stability of the wage quartiles of stayers before and after the end of the 
apprenticeship period 
























e  P25 P25-P50 P50-P75 >P75 
P25 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 
P25 – P50 0.05 0.19 0.15 0.05 
P50-P75 0.04 0.13 0.12 0.04 
>P75 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 
Number of observations: 36470, all stayers in establishments with at least two apprenticeship graduates. Source: 




Table A5: IV Regression on the Proportion of Apprentices. 
 First Stage Second Stage 




Deviation from within-firm retention rate 0.761 
(3.67)  




Squared Number of Employees  













Number of Observations 4561  
Sample contains all apprenticeship graduates in the first skilled job after graduates. Sample Restriction: at least 
two employees in each firm. Source: LIAB longitudinal version 2, 1999-2003. 
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Table A6: Descriptive Statistics of the Estimation Sample (N=4561) 
 Mean SD 
Proportion of Apprentices on all Employees* 0.086 0.714 
Dummy: Poaching Victim 0.030 0.171 
Dummy: Collective Bargaining Agreement 0.825 0.380 
Dummy: Works Council 0.800 0.399 
Number of Employees 555 1245 
Proportion of Skilled Employees on all 
Employees* 
0.724 0.234 
Proportion of Part-Time Employees on all 
Employees* 
0.079 0.1434 
Proportion of Employees who are older then 50 on 
all Employees 
0.108 0.060 
Proportion of Foreign Employees on all 
Employees 
0.062 0.085 
Proportion of Female Employees on all Employees 0.324 0.272 
Log of Investments 13.48 2.804 
Exportshare 0.182 0.255 
Source: LIAB longitudinal version 2, 1999-2003. 
 
